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Abstract
Does structural adjustment increase party system instability in Latin America? We employ the Latin American Presidential
and Legislative Elections (LAPALE) database (http://www.lapaledata.com) and our own original data set for structural
adjustment to assess the effects of structural adjustment and other economic, social, and political variables on legislative
volatility in 18 Latin American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. The results of our study indicate that structural
adjustment results in higher levels of within-system electoral volatility and support a broad version of economic voting theory.
Extra-system electoral volatility is driven primarily by institutional and demographic factors. Our findings also highlight the
importance of disaggregating electoral volatility as within-system volatility and extra-system volatility appear to be largely
driven by different factors, or in different ways by the same factors.
Keywords
Latin America, electoral volatility, structural adjustment, political party systems

Introduction
Electoral volatility is thought to reflect the level of a party
system’s stability and is, therefore, a prominent topic in the
comparative politics literature. Significant discord and gaps,
however, remain in the literature. For example, the study of
the relationship between economic factors and electoral volatility in Latin America extends back decades, and yet no
consensus has emerged on the economic factors that drive
electoral volatility or whether economic factors play any role
at all (compare Remmer (1991), Roberts and Wibbels (1999),
and Cohen et al. (2018)). Perhaps more important, there has
been little attention given to the role of economic adjustment. Recent scholarship has pointed to the importance of
studying economic factors that gain salience in particular
contexts, including structural adjustment policies associated
with lending by the international creditors during periods of
economic distress (Frieden & Walter, 2017; Kuenzi et al.,
2019). In Latin America, International Monetary Fund (IMF)
structural adjustment policies that followed severe debt or
currency crises have been highly salient (and controversial),
and studies have linked them to citizens’ political behavior in
the region (Ortiz & Béjar, 2013). Nevertheless, to date, no
study has provided a quantitative analysis of the effects of
structural adjustment on electoral volatility in Latin America.
An additional limitation of the prior literature concerns
the measure of volatility employed in most analyses. Many

analysts tend to focus on overall volatility. This has been
captured with “Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, which
measures the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all
parties from one election to the next” (Mainwaring & Scully,
1995, p. 6). To be sure, a few scholars have disaggregated
electoral volatility into two types (e.g., Mainwaring et al.,
2017; Powell & Tucker, 2014; Weghorst & Bernhard, 2014).
Extra-system volatility (or Type-A volatility) is created by
“the entry and exit of parties from the political system” while
within-system volatility (or Type-B volatility) “occurs when
voters switch their votes between existing parties” (Powell &
Tucker, 2014, p. 124). (Some scholars, such as Powell and
Tucker (2014) and Weghorst and Bernhard (2014), use the
terms “Type-A volatility” and “Type-B volatility.” We have
adopted Mainwaring et al.’s (2017) phraseology of “withinsystem volatility” and “extra-system volatility.”) Still, the
few studies that have disaggregated electoral volatility have
neglected the possible role of structural adjustment, while
their analyses of economic influences has been limited in
1

University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA
Lamar State College Port Arthur,Texas, USA

2

Corresponding Author:
Michelle Kuenzi, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 4505 S. Maryland Parkway Box 455029,
Las Vegas, NV 89154-5029, USA.
Email: michele.kuenzi@unlv.edu

Creative Commons CC BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of
the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages
(https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).

2
certain respects. With regard to Latin America, only the
study by Cohen et al. (2018) has disaggregated electoral volatility and attempted to identify the economic factors associated with within-system volatility and extra-system volatility
in the region. However, as Cohen et al.’s (2018) purpose was
to introduce their new volatility data set (Latin American
Presidential and Legislative Elections [LAPALE]), their
study was limited to an examination of only inflation, growth,
and nominal exchange rates; importantly, they did not study
the role of structural adjustment or model other standard
institutional or demographic influences. They suggest that
future scholars using the LAPALE data set will need to provide a comprehensive analysis of the various economic,
institutional, and demographic factors associated with different types of volatility.
As one step in filling these gaps in the literature, this study
examines the effects of structural adjustment on electoral
volatility in Latin America, while controlling for other standard economic, institutional, and sociodemographic influences. We also seek to improve our understanding of the
topic by examining within-system, extra-system, and total
volatility. Drawing upon the LAPALE database (http://www.
lapaledata.com) and our own original data set for structural
adjustment, we focus on legislative volatility in 18 Latin
American countries during the period of 1982 to 2016. (See
Table A2 in the Appendix for the countries in the sample and
the number of observed elections per country.)
This study finds support for a broad version of economic
voting theory. Consistent with theoretical expectations, we
find that structural adjustment heightens within-system volatility, which suggests that voters who bear the short-term
costs of reform switch to other established opposition parties,
thereby punishing governing parties who consent to IMF
conditionality. After accounting for the role of adjustment,
our results indicate that economic growth does not exhibit a
significant influence on legislative volatility in the Latin
American countries examined in this study. Beyond adjustment, extra-system volatility appears to be driven primarily
by institutional arrangements and social demography.
This study addresses a topic of great scholarly and realworld importance. Despite the prevalence of structural
adjustment and the depth of adjustment’s effects, the political implications of structural adjustment are still not fully
understood. A quick search in Google Scholar reveals that
thousands of scholarly works have been written on structural adjustment in Latin America. To our knowledge, none
of these works has offered a quantitative examination of the
relationship between structural adjustment and electoral
volatility, a key indicator of party system institutionalization. According to the scholarly literature, party system
institutionalization is integrally linked to regime stability,
sound policymaking, and the quality of democracy, all of
which in turn help determine people’s quality of life (e.g.,
see Mainwaring & Scully, 1995; Mainwaring & Zoco, 2007;
Robbins, 2010; Rose & Mishler, 2010, p. 802).
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Moreover, this is the only study that, to date, examines the
effects of social demography and political institutions on the
different types of volatility in Latin America. As we can see
in the results of our study, disaggregating volatility into
extra-system volatility and within-system volatility is important, as they appear to be driven by different variables or in
opposite ways by the same variables. As Kuenzi et al. (2019)
note in their study of Africa, extra-system volatility has been
on the rise, while Andrews and Bairett (2014) find that extrasystem volatility constitutes more of total volatility in Central
and Eastern Europe than does within-system volatility. (In
contrast, Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) and Powell and
Tucker (2014) find that this type of volatility is declining in
Africa and post-Communist Europe, respectively.) In Latin
America, Cohen et al. (2018, Figure 1) also provide evidence
that extra-system volatility accounts for a larger share of
overall volatility than within-system volatility. These trends
pose profound challenges for democratic governance.
Although scholars have tended to view within-system volatility as playing a wholesome role in democratic systems,
Powell and Tucker (2014, p. 124) note that party system
instability is most strongly linked to extra-system volatility,
a type of volatility that creates some unique difficulties for
democracy and macroeconomic stability. For these reasons,
there remains an ongoing need to study the forces that give
rise to electoral volatility.

Literature Review and Theory
Economic Performance
Many studies have examined the potential influence of economic factors on electoral volatility. The notion that economic factors influence electoral volatility rests on the idea
that citizens’ voting behavior is shaped by the performance
of the economy. According to economic voting theory, voters
will reward incumbents with their votes for positive economic performance, while punishing them for negative performance by redirecting their electoral support to another
party or candidate. Economic voting theory, which has been
the subject of hundreds of studies, has found strong empirical support (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000).
Some scholars have contended, however, that the support
for the notion that economic performance influences electoral volatility is mixed (e.g., Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011;
Cohen et al., 2018; Nadeau et al., 2017, p. 99). In the context
of Latin America, Cohen et al. (2018) note that their results
for the period from 1980 to 1990 support those of Remmer
(1991) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) who find that economic variables influence electoral volatility in Latin
American countries. According to Cohen et al. (2018),
however, these results are not stable across time and one
sees no such relationships between legislative volatility and
these economic variables in the period from 1978 to 2016.
Hernández and Kriesi (2016) find that the “Great Recession”
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had relatively weak effects on party stability in Central and
Eastern Europe “where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant” (203). In contrast, they
find that this recession played a significant role in undermining the stability of party systems in Western Europe
(203). Ferree (2010) concludes that economic factors do not
play a role in electoral volatility in African countries.
Perhaps these disparate claims emanate from the fact
that most of the studies of economic voting focus on the
advanced industrialized democracies, particularly the
United States. The studies of emerging democracies are
much less numerous. Although Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier
(2008, p. 320) conclude that, overall, economic voting
theory is supported by the studies of transitional democracies, they note that many questions on this topic are still
unanswered. For example, the economic variables likely to
be at play are not clear. Scholars such as Bernhard and
Karakoc (2011) have also raised the point that traditional
indicators of economic performance such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth may not have the same effects
on voting behavior in different contexts. Indeed, Bernhard
and Karakoc (2011) find that inequality, which is a postauthoritarian phenomenon in the post-Communist countries, influences electoral volatility while economic growth
does not. Like Bernhard and Karakoc (2011), Kuenzi et al.
(2019) identify indicators outside of those most commonly
used to examine the relationship between economic factors
and volatility in Africa. Kuenzi et al. (2019) test the effects
of two international political economy variables, donor aid
and IMF structural adjustment programs, which have been
salient in African countries but have not otherwise been
tested in the literature. They find that aid and structural
adjustment do indeed have significant effects on electoral
volatility in Africa. Aid tends to lessen volatility while
adjustment tends to boost it.

Structural Adjustment
Some of the dynamics surrounding structural adjustment in
Africa are shared by Latin American countries. In particular,
structural adjustment has been unpopular with the publics of
most African and Latin American countries. As required by
the IMF, structural adjustment agreements generally obligate
governments to privatize state-owned industries, reduce the
number of public sector employees, cut social spending,
deregulate, and eliminate subsidies and price controls
(Tuman, 2000). Adjustment policies impose costs on citizens
in the short to medium term, but they are intended to lead to
a more sustainable economic environment in the future. To
be sure, adjustment has been both extremely salient and
unpopular in Latin America (Almeida, 2007), and the similarities in the public’s reaction to structural adjustment in
Latin American countries and African countries are striking.
As noted, although many other economic variables have
been examined previously, no one has empirically tested the
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effects of structural adjustment on electoral volatility in the
Latin American context.
The effects of structural adjustment operate through two
key mechanisms. First, as noted by Ortiz and Béjar (2013),
structural adjustment increases contentious collective action
in Latin America partly because people doubt the legitimacy
of a government that cedes control over economic policy to
an international organization (492). Similarly, Bratton and
van de Walle (1997), who link structural adjustment to political protest in Africa, attribute the unpopularity of structural
adjustment in Africa to the loss of legitimacy incurred by
governments who compromise national sovereignty and
enter into adjustment agreements with the IMF, an international organization that is perceived to be dominated by the
United States (i.e., the “Washington Consensus”). Kuenzi
et al. (2019) argue that it is governments’ appearance of
weakness and loss of legitimacy under adjustment that
explains the positive effect of structural adjustment on electoral volatility. Given the effects of structural adjustment on
protest in Latin America, it would seem likely to affect other
types of political behavior such as voting. Thus, we would
expect structural adjustment to have a similar effect on electoral volatility in Latin America. Previous government supporters are likely to abandon the ruling party at the polls after
the government agrees to structural adjustment and give their
vote to another party which will give rise to electoral volatility. If established opposition parties have a track record of
resisting IMF loans, then they may reap the benefits of voters’ dissatisfaction with governing parties over adjustment.
The second mechanism concerns the effects of adjustment
on resources that are key to political patronage. Our logic is
similar to that spelled out by Kuenzi et al. (2019). The economic reforms prescribed by the IMF may weaken the state’s
control over employment, subsidies, and spending which is
likely to lead to a loss of support for the ruling party. Greene
(2010) argues that it is the control of state resources that
allows dominant parties to stay in power because these
resources can be used in a multitude of ways to bolster the
position of the ruling party, such as for patronage or election
campaigns (Greene, 2010, pp. 811–812). Therefore, these
economic reforms make it more difficult for the ruling party
to reward their clients and diminish the advantage it previously had in campaigning. We would therefore expect these
reforms to encourage voters to switch their support from the
incumbent party to another party.
We argue that the context influences whether voters
unhappy with the ruling party for acquiescing to structural
adjustment will turn to new parties or established opposition
parties. More specifically, we argue that in contrast to other
regions, such as Africa, Latin America comprises numerous
countries that have had established opposition parties that
could represent the antistructural adjustment stances of their
citizens. We argue that the supply of parties in a country
influences whether voters punish ruling parties for poor
performance by transferring their support to established
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opposition parties or new parties. This argument is consistent to those of other authors such as Benton (2005) who
contends that how citizens dissatisfied with the incumbent
party reallocate their votes depends on whether small or new
parties have been able to enter the political system. Although
Kuenzi et al. (2019) find that structural adjustment increases
legislative volatility primarily through extra-system volatility in African countries, we hypothesize that structural
adjustment will increase legislative volatility primarily
through within-system volatility in the context of Latin
America. Although surveys have shown varying levels of
confidence in political parties, established opposition parties in Latin America have provided a more viable alternative for those angry about their government entering into
structural adjustment agreements with the IMF than have
established opposition parties in Africa. In contrast to the
situation in African countries, existing opposition parties
had established themselves as being anti-adjustment in a
number of Latin American countries. For example, existing
prominent leftist parties were able to represent citizens’
anti-adjustment sentiments in countries such as Brazil,
Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay
(Roberts, 2013, p. 1436). Even though adjustment fostered
notable instability in Argentina’s party system, it was one
faction of the Peronist party that ultimately took up the antireform mantle (Roberts, 2013, p. 1440). In Latin America,
import substitution industrialization (ISI) gave rise to a
strong organized labor sector that helped structure the party
system (Roberts, 2013). Even if new political parties had to
emerge to channel antieconomic reform sentiment in Latin
American countries, the new party that emerged to fill the
gap could potentially count on the support of a large voting
bloc in the future. Indeed, although Roberts (2013, p. 1447)
notes the inchoate nature of political party competition in
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, countries that saw their
party systems completely destabilized by economic reform,
he acknowledges the potential for these systems to stabilize
in the future. In his words:
. . . the new, anti-neoliberal leftist alternatives in countries such
as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have revived programmatic
contestation in national political systems. As such, they may
eventually provide a foundation for the reconfiguration of
party systems around a central ideological and programmatic
cleavage.

In Africa, existing opposition parties have generally not provided a credible vehicle for those upset with structural adjustment to channel their sentiments. Overall, political parties in
Africa are much younger and less institutionalized than those
in Latin America (Kuenzi & Lambright, 2001), and the opposition in most countries is weak (Bleck & van de Walle,
2019; Rakner & van de Walle, 2009). Organized labor is
weak in Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997) and therefore
has not helped structure the party system. Thus, fewer parties
have established consistent reputations for policy stances. In

fact, position taking is rare among parties in African countries (Bleck & van de Walle, 2019), where political support is
largely obtained and sustained through clientelism and the
distribution of state resources (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997;
Englebert & Dunn, 2019). Also, as Resnick (2014, p. 59)
notes, Africa has more electoral coalitions than one would
expect, given the prevalence of presidential executive systems in the region. In the case of coalitions involving the
incumbent parties, opposition parties that have participated
in governments that agree to adjustment would be tainted
with the decisions of the governing parties. In countries such
as these, the opposition parties would not be credible vehicles for expressing opposition to structural adjustment. As
most political parties in Africa are not programmatic, a new
party able to capture the support of those upset with the ruling party for entering structural adjustment agreements
would have a harder time maintaining a stable constituency
to support it into the future. Therefore, extra-system volatility is more likely to occur in the future elections in the political systems of Africa than those of Latin America. In short,
we have reason to expect that structural adjustment will be
associated with within-system in Latin America, notwithstanding the findings of Kuenzi et al. (2019) concerning
adjustment’s positive effect on extra-system volatility in
Africa.

The Role of Other Factors
Institutions. Institutional arrangements are also thought
to play a role in legislative volatility. The electoral system
could influence the level of legislative volatility and therefore we examine the effects of using a plurality electoral
system to elect at least some legislators on volatility. Based
on Duverger’s propositions and the work of many others, a
plurality single-member district (SMD) system tends to create significant barriers to the entry of new parties into the
electoral arena and militate against the existence of small
parties. As Andrews and Bairett (2014, pp. 310–311) note,
Cox (1997) theorizes that such conditions encourage political elites to coordinate. We would therefore generally expect
countries that use plurality SMD systems to elect even
some of the legislators in the upper house or lower house to
have lower levels of electoral volatility, on average. Since
extra-system volatility is created by the entry of new parties
into the political arena, we would expect this effect to be
strongest on extra-system volatility. Some research fails to
find, however, that the electoral system influences electoral
volatility in post-Communist countries (Powell & Tucker,
2014) and Africa (Bogaards, 2008; Ferree, 2010; Mozaffar
& Scarritt, 2005). Moreover, Kuenzi et al. (2019) and Weghorst and Bernhard (2014) report a significant negative relationship between district magnitude and volatility in African
countries. Weghorst and Bernhard (2014, p. 1724) invoke
Tavits’ (2005) explanation for this relationship as she also
finds a negative relationship between district magnitude
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and volatility. According to Tavits (2005, p. 292), in the context of new democracies where voter loyalty may be low and
political party platforms may not be easily distinguishable,
voters are able to select among numerous parties in more
permissive political party systems. Therefore, when voters
are unhappy with the party they supported previously, a large
group of such voters is less likely to redirect its support to a
new party.
If the situation in Latin America matches Tavits’ (2005)
description, we would expect a negative relationship between
party fractionalization and electoral volatility. It is worth noting, however, that the conventional wisdom has been that the
level of party fragmentation is positively associated with
electoral volatility. The logic behind this hypothesized relationship is straightforward. Drawing on Pedersen’s (1983)
description of the relationship between party fragmentation
and electoral volatility, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) explain
that, as more and more political parties enter the political
arena, parties tend to be closer in terms of ideology and programmatic commitments than they do when there are only a
few parties. Under these conditions, voters are more likely to
be able to choose among several parties that represent their
preferences and therefore have a greater propensity to change
their vote choices from election to election (161–2).
Whether presidential and legislative elections are held
concurrently may also influence electoral volatility in Latin
America. Andrews and Bairett (2014, p. 311) expand on
Cox’s (1997) logic that as more elections are held simultaneously, party leaders will have a greater incentive to coordinate their activities. This coordination ultimately results in
fewer parties. Andrews and Bairett (2014, p. 311) hypothesize that the coordination that is likely to accompany concurrently held legislative and presidential elections will also
result in less electoral volatility. The results of their study of
Central and European democracies support this hypothesis.
We also test the effects of concurrent elections on volatility;
to our knowledge, this has not been done in the context of
Latin America.
In addition, we would expect the quality of democracy to
be related to electoral volatility. Based on the literature, in a
healthy democracy, we would expect to see shifts in support
among existing parties based on how citizens evaluate the
performance of these parties when they are in office. On the
contrary, high extra-system volatility may indicate that political parties are not effectively representing and building relationships with the people leading to frequent party entry into
and party exit from the political arena. We would therefore
expect there to be a positive relationship between democracy
and within-system volatility while we expect there to be a
negative relationship between democracy and extra-system
volatility.
Social Demography. Beyond institutional factors, we might
also expect the social demography of a country to affect electoral volatility. Based on the experience of Western Europe,
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Birnir (2007) contends that ethnic voting could potentially
stabilize party systems in new democracies. On the contrary, given the shifts that can occur in the ethnic alliances
encompassed in parties, we might expect that more ethnic
diversity would lead to more volatility. Some studies of postCommunist Europe fail to find a relationship between ethnic
divisions and volatility (Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011; Powell & Tucker, 2014; Tavits, 2005), but other studies find that
the ethnic composition of the population influences volatility in Africa (Ferree, 2010; Kuenzi et al., 2019; Weghorst &
Bernhard, 2014), and it would appear that the tendency of
multiethnic coalitions to fall apart over time boosts volatility
(Ferree, 2010). In addition, Madrid (2005) finds a positive
relationship between the relative size of the indigenous population and electoral volatility in Latin American countries.
He attributes this relationship to the new parties that emerged
to represent the interests of indigenous groups, which had
previously been neglected by the established parties. Given
these findings, we hypothesize that higher levels of ethnic
diversity will be associated with higher levels of electoral
volatility in Latin America. On a related note, countries with
large populations are less likely to be cohesive. We would
therefore expect a positive relationship between the size of a
country’s population and electoral volatility.

Data and Methods
Our analysis focuses on the lower chamber legislative elections in 18 Latin American countries for the period of 1982
to 2016. During the study period, Latin America went
through a tumultuous period including the 1982 debt crisis,
economic reforms, and regime changes (Smith, 2013; Tuman
et al., 2001). In addition, during this period, the IMF made
agreements with numerous Latin American countries which
required governments to adhere to policy prescriptions and
conditionalities established by the Fund (Pop-Eleches, 2009).
This coincided with a great increase in electoral volatility in
the region between the 1980s and 1990s (Cohen et al., 2018).
As such, the time-series for the study is appropriate to test
our hypotheses.
As there is a variation in how frequently countries in the
region hold elections, the panels are unbalanced (i.e., the
number of year observations for each panel are not uniform).
For example, Argentina holds parliamentary elections every
other year, while in Chile, they are held every 4 years.
Furthermore, some countries appear more often in the data
set due to their earlier transition to democracy. On average,
each country in the study held 8.16 elections. (Table A2 in
the Appendix displays the countries of study and the number
of observed elections per country.)
The dependent variables measuring electoral volatility are
gathered from the LAPALE data set. The LAPALE data set
(Cohen et al., 2018) has been subjected to peer review and
published in a highly selective outlet, the Journal of Politics.
The data set provides transparent coding rules for cases, and,
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to the best of our knowledge, there are no published critiques
of the accuracy of the data. An advantage of using the
LAPALE data set is that it provides information for extrasystem volatility, within-system volatility, and total volatility
between consecutive elections measured in terms of vote
share. Theoretically, the measurement for each type of volatility can range from no change between elections (0) to fullscale change (100). There are considerable variations among
countries in Latin America when it comes to electoral volatility. In countries such as Chile and Honduras, the average
total volatility is less than 20% compared to Guatemala and
Peru where it is more than 50%. Similarly, there are differences among countries with regard to whether extra-system
volatility or within-system volatility are more prevalent
which illustrates the importance of testing for the influences
of the covariates on the different types of volatility.
We evaluate the influences of countries under IMF adjustment programs by constructing a binary variable in which
countries were coded as “1” if they had received an adjustment disbursement from the Fund in that particular year, and
“0” otherwise. The covariate was constructed using information from the website of the International Monetary Fund
(various years), and it was lagged by 1 year. We expect that
the effects of IMF programs on voters’ judgments will be
lagged, as the influence of conditionality gradually becomes
evident (see Kuenzi et al., 2019). Furthermore, the 1-year lag
structure in the IMF measure reduces possible endogeneity
between IMF disbursement and electoral outcomes.
In addition, we include standard measures that test for the
potential impact of economic factors on electoral volatility,
including the log of GDP per capita and the percent change
in GDP per capita. The information for the economic indicators is gathered from the World Bank (various years), transformed into 2010 constant dollars and lagged by 1 year.
(Table A3 in the Appendix shows the countries and years that
are coded as having an IMF disbursement.)
Two dichotomous institutional covariates are included to
indicate whether a country uses a plurality system or not to
elect at least some of the legislators and if it holds concurrent
presidential and legislative elections. Polity IV scores, lagged
by 1 year, are used to control for a country’s level of democracy. In addition, we include a variable to account for how
long a country has had multiparty elections. Our measure of
experience with multiparty elections, which is named age of
democracy, is based on Cohen et al.’s (2018) data. We also
performed the analysis including a measure of age of democracy that included the election prior to the first election listed
in Cohen et al.’s (2018) data set and the results were essentially the same. A variable measuring the fractionalization of
the party system lagged from the previous election is also
included (data are from the LAPALE data set). Furthermore,
we control for countries’ level of ethnic diversity (data are
from Alesina & et al, 2003) and population size. The log of
population, lagged by 1 year, was obtained from the World
Bank (various years). The descriptive statistics for the
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variables are provided in Table 1, and more details on the
measures and sources for each independent variable are provided in the Appendix in Table A1.
As noted, the data set includes observations for 18 countries for the study period (36 years). Thus, the data set may
be described as time-series cross-section. Initial tests suggested that heteroscedasticity in the errors is present in the
data (Breusch-Pagan and Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity, p<.001 for all models). To adjust for heteroscedasticity, we estimate the models with pooled ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected standard
errors (Beck & Katz, 1995). The ratio of year-to-country
observations is more than adequate for panel correction of
the standard errors. However, we also estimated all models
with pooled OLS and Driscoll–Kraay standard errors to
address concerns about finite sample issues (see Hoechle,
2007, p. 5). The results of these trials were completely
consistent with the estimates with pooled OLS with panelcorrected standard errors.
The data on elections and volatility have gaps across
years, and, as such, one might expect that the degree of autocorrelation in the errors might be lower. Additional analysis
indicated that the pooled autocorrelation parameter, rho, was
.09 or smaller for within-system, extra-system, or total volatility, suggesting that serial correlation of the errors is low
and not compromising our results. For this reason, the specifications do not include any corrections for autocorrelation.
Alternative trials with a fixed-effects estimation (with
dummy variables for all years and countries) proved to be
unviable due to excessively high levels of multicollinearity
between some substantive covariates and country dummy
variables. Indeed, in the fixed-effects trial, the variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for the log of population and log of
GDP per capita were 997 and 122, respectively, while nine
country variables exhibited VIF scores ranging from more
than 300 to 600 (with a mean VIF score of 125 for all equations). This suggests that the level of collinearity for fixedeffects regression is well beyond tolerance. However, it
should be noted that for our models, which are estimated
with pooled OLS, the level of collinearity was within tolerance (maximum VIF score of 1.92 for the log of population,
while all other covariates were lower; and a mean VIF of
1.36 or lower for all equations).
In addition, the pattern of the residual variance ratios for
each country was compact and exhibited a fairly uniform
pattern indicating that a fixed-effects regression model
would be mis-specified (see Stimson, 1985). The summed
residuals and residual variance ratios for each country (unit)
were not large (less than two times the mean of the dependent variable), which suggests that the model results are not
driven by a subset of countries in the data set. Still, to address
concerns raised by one reviewer, we omitted Mexico as a
potentially influential unit and re-estimated the equations
for Models 1 to 3. In these trials, the results for the IMF
adjustment covariate were completely consistent with the
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable

Obs.

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

Total volatility
Type A
Type B
IMF disbursement, lag
Party fractionalization, lag
Plurality system
Concurrent elections
Democracy, lag
Ethnic diversity
Population, log
GDP per capita (log, t−1)
GDP growth, lag
Age of democracy

147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147
147

.378
.237
.143
.265
.265
.476
.721
7.24
.429
2.71
8.46
3.55
14.7

.24
.234
.078
.443
.119
.501
.445
2.68
.186
1.14
.652
3.90
9.28

.042
0
0
0
.064
0
0
−8
.169
.862
7.02
−13.38
0

1
1
.391
1
.597
1
1
10
.74
5.31
9.55
18.29
34

original models, and results for other covariates did not
change.

Results
Does structural adjustment stimulate electoral volatility in
Latin America? Table 2 presents the results for models of
within-system volatility, extra-system volatility, and total
volatility. As can be seen in Model 1, Table 2, our hypothesis
that structural adjustment increases within-system volatility
is borne out in the results for within-system volatility. The
coefficient for structural adjustment is positive and significant (p <.01) in the model for within-system volatility
(Model 1), indicating that vote shares among existing parties
are likely to be less stable in countries undergoing structural
adjustment. The coefficient for structural adjustment fails to
gain significance in the models for extra-system and total
volatility (Models 2 to 3). These findings are consistent with
our expectations. Structural adjustment is a highly visible
issue in the context of Latin America and Africa and has been
found to motivate protesting in both regions. As noted, in the
case of African countries, Kuenzi et al. (2019) also find that
structural adjustment boosts electoral volatility, yet their
findings suggest that it does so primarily be increasing extrasystem volatility. We argue that the divergent pattern in Latin
America is due to the supply of established opposition parties, on average, that have been able to articulate voters’ discontent with reforms. By contrast, voters may be more open
to appeals from new parties that promise to undo IMFbacked programs in Africa, where opposition parties are
generally weak (Rakner & van de Walle, 2009) and nonprogrammatic. Moreover, although there is a great deal of variation in the level of party system institutionalization across
countries in both Africa and Latin America, as noted, the
party systems of Latin America tend to be older and more
institutionalized than those of Africa (Kuenzi & Lambright,
2001, pp. 462–463). Taken together, these results suggest
that incumbent parties will be punished at the polls for

entering into structural adjustment agreements. Our results
support the contention that whether disillusioned voters
decide to put their support behind a new party or one that
already exists depends on the conditions in the regional context. More specifically, when existing opposition parties provide a credible vehicle for channeling the sentiments of
voters dissatisfied with the government, as opposition parties
have in numerous Latin American countries, those dissatisfied voters will transfer their support to an established opposition party, giving rise to within-system volatility.
Of course, another international factor—foreign aid
flows—might also have an effect in reducing different types
of electoral volatility in Latin America. In separate trials, we
estimated Models 1 to 3 with the log of bilateral aid per capita (in constant 2010 dollars, and lagged 1 year) to each
country from all donors in the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development
Assistance Committee. The coefficient for lagged aid was
insignificant, while results for the models were consistent.
Although bilateral aid has been shown to reduce volatility in
Africa (Kuenzi et al., 2019), it has less effect in Latin America
because it comprises a much smaller share of government
budgets and spending, on average, in the region. For this reason, bilateral aid flows have less influence on the electoral
fortunes of ruling parties in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The coefficient for economic growth, a standard indicator of economic performance, is not significant. Economic
growth therefore does not appear to affect legislative volatility. This finding together with the finding that structural
adjustment tends to elevate within-system volatility highlight the importance of identifying the economic issues
likely to be prominent in the context of study. Wealthy
countries appear to have less extra-system volatility and
total volatility than their less-wealthy counterparts. This
result is not surprising because GDP per capita has been
used in some studies as an indicator of government capacity
(e.g., see Fearon & Laitin, 2003), a concept closely linked
to institutionalization.
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Table 2. Determinants of Electoral Volatility in Latin America.
Variables
IMF program(t−1)
Party
fractionalization(t−1)
Plurality system
Concurrent elections
Democracy(t−1)
Ethnic diversity
Population (ln)
GDP per capita(ln, t−1)
GDP per capita
change(t−1)
Age of democracy
Constant
Observations

Model 1—within-system volatility
0.0365**
(0.0136)
−0.155*
(0.0643)
−0.0121
(0.0141)
−0.0257+
(0.0146)
−0.00329
(0.00257)
0.0469
(0.0390)
−0.00857
(0.00598)
0.0143
(0.0117)
−0.000855
(0.00167)
−0.000169
(0.000658)
0.110
(0.106)
147

Model 2—extra-system volatility
−0.000854
(0.0381)
−0.207
(0.186)
−0.127***
(0.0283)
0.0803*
(0.0361)
−0.0159*
(0.00759)
0.289**
(0.118)
0.0259+
(0.0144)
−0.103***
(0.0282)
−0.000180
(0.00530)
0.00355+
(0.00196)
1.034***
(0.279)
147

Model 3—total volatility
0.0356
(0.0413)
−0.361*
(0.176)
−0.139***
(0.0300)
0.0547
(0.0404)
−0.0192**
(0.00746)
0.336**
(0.114)
0.0173
(0.0156)
−0.0886***
(0.0271)
−0.00104
(0.00479)
0.00338+
(0.00193)
1.144***
(0.269)
147

Top entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. GDP, gross domestic product.
+
p ≤ .10. *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

Beyond economic influences, what do the models suggest
about institutional and sociodemographic factors? The
results displayed in Table 2 suggest that party fractionalization generally depresses within-system volatility and overall
electoral volatility. This finding is consistent with Tavits’
(2005) logic that a larger number of parties from which citizens can select may reduce large-scale shifts in citizen support from one party to another. The coefficient for party
fractionalization is, however, negative but not significant in
the model of extra-system volatility. The fragmentation of
the political party system would therefore not seem to have
any effect on whether new parties successfully enter the electoral arena.
As one can see in Table 2, consistent with expectations,
the coefficient for plurality systems is negative and significant in the model of extra-system volatility (Model 2). This
type of electoral system erects significant barriers to entering
the political arena. Therefore, using this electoral system to
elect even some of the legislators tends to depress extra-system volatility. The coefficient for plurality is also negative
and significant in the model for total volatility. Although the
coefficient for plurality is negative for within-system volatility, it is not significant. This finding has implications for
potential ways to address extra-system volatility. Allocating
some of the legislative seats through the plurality formula
would appear to encourage coordination among political
actors and depress extra-system volatility.

The concurrency of presidential and legislative elections
would appear to influence both within-system volatility and
extra-system volatility, but in opposite ways. As theorized in
the literature, holding concurrent presidential and legislative
elections mitigates within-system volatility as party leaders
have a strong motivation to coordinate, and people tend to
like to vote for the same party for the both the legislative
seat(s) and presidential office. Indeed, the coefficient for
concurrency is negative and significant in the model for
within-system volatility, albeit at the .1 level. In contrast, as
demonstrated in Table 2, the coefficient for concurrency is
positive and highly significant in the model of extra-system
volatility. Although this result may initially seem surprising,
there is a logic to the finding. If a political outsider who is
relatively popular contests a presidential election, s/he is
likely to create a new party as her or his political vehicle.
Those supporting the political outsider for the presidential
election may also transfer support to the new outsider party
in the legislative election. Within the recent history of Latin
America, there are numerous examples of this phenomenon. For example, when Alberto Fujimori first emerged as
a right-wing populist presidential candidate in Peru’s 1990
election, he formed a new party, Cambio 90, which garnered 16.5% of legislative seats when he was elected
(Roberts, 2006, pp. 93–94). Similarly, in Venezuela, Hugo
Chávez’s left-wing candidacy was accompanied by the formation of the Movimiento V. República (MVR) (Ellner,
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2005). MVR won 20% of legislative seats with Chávez in
the 1998 election (and increased its seat share to 55% in the
2000 elections following adoption of a new constitution).
The creation of PAIS in Ecuador (2006), which was a vehicle
for Rafael Correa’s candidacy, also illustrates this pattern.
Consistent with expectations, ethnic diversity is associated with higher levels of electoral volatility. The coefficient for ethnic diversity is positive in the models for
extra-system and total volatility. The results for this covariate for extra-system volatility are also intuitive. As different groups are incorporated into the political system, new
parties are likely to emerge to represent their interests. This
pattern has been well-documented with parties and indigenous groups in Ecuador, but other cases are also illustrative.
In Bolivia, the MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) and MIP
(Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti) parties increasingly represented members of the Aymara and Quechua after their
mobilization in the 1990s (Van Cott, 2005, pp. 12, 95–96).
Van Cott (2005, p. 12, n. 9) also provides examples of parties in Colombia that emerged to incorporate newly active
Afro-Colombians. Interestingly, ethnic diversity has a
strong positive effect on within-system volatility in African
countries but does not have a significant effect on extrasystem volatility (Kuenzi et al., 2019). As noted, ethnic
diversity appears to be connected to extra-system volatility
in Latin America because new parties have emerged in
countries to represent different groups as they become
incorporated into the system (see Madrid, 2005). In Africa,
the most ethnically diverse region of the world, ethnic
diversity appears to be linked to within-system volatility
not because of the incorporation of new groups that require
new parties to represent them but because ethnic coalitions
tend to be unstable (Ferree, 2010) resulting in shifting alliances. The coefficient for the log of the population is positive, as expected, but is only significant at the 0.1 level in
the model for extra-system volatility (Model 2). It appears
that it is the level of diversity of the population rather than
the population size that affects electoral volatility.
The level of democracy appears to have a mitigating
effect on extra-system volatility and total volatility, as the
coefficients for these variables are negative and significant.
The coefficient for democracy is negative but not significant
in the model for within-system volatility. This finding is consistent with the argument that extra-system volatility and
democratic strength are negatively associated with each
other. Where democracy is strong, we would expect established parties to be available to articulate the sentiments of
the citizens. In contrast, the coefficient for the age of the
democratic regime is positive and significant at the .1 level in
the models for extra-system volatility and total volatility,
suggesting that a longer experience with multiparty elections
is associated with higher levels of extra-system volatility and
total volatility. At first, this result may seem surprising, but it
makes a great deal of sense, given the trends toward the
greater incorporation of different groups we have seen over
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time in the political systems of Latin American countries,
which we discuss above. This finding is consistent with those
of many other studies which do not find that party systems
stabilize over time (e.g., see Bernhard & Karakoc, 2011;
Bogaards, 2008; Lindberg, 2007; Mainwaring & Zoco,
2007). Although the length of time a country has had experience with multiparty elections does not appear to be related
extra-system volatility in the way one would expect, the
level of democracy does have a dampening effect on the
level of extra-system volatility. Thus, it does not appear to
be the length of time a country has been a democracy but
rather the quality of democracy that depresses the likelihood of new parties entering the political arena and attracting support.

Conclusion
This study supports a broad version of the economic voting
theory and suggests that the political economy variables
that influence voting behavior and by extension electoral
volatility are likely to differ across contexts, depending on
which economic issues are salient to the public. Indeed, our
results do not indicate that there is a straightforward relationship between economic downturns and electoral volatility in Latin American countries as economic growth does
not register a significant relationship with electoral volatility. We add to the prior literature by demonstrating that
structural adjustment increases legislative volatility in Latin
America, where neoliberal reforms have been a salient issue.
Given that structural adjustment also increases legislative
volatility in Africa’s multiparty electoral regimes, it seems
reasonable to hypothesize that structural adjustment will
contribute to volatility in those countries where it has been a
prominent issue. Therefore, we are helping to refine the
economic voting theory as it applies to transitional democracies. Moreover, the results of our study lend support to
the notion that whether voters punish ruling parties for poor
performance by shifting their votes to established opposition parties or new parties depends on a country’s supply of
parties.
Our findings also highlight the importance of disaggregating electoral volatility when attempting to identify the
factors behind it. Within-system volatility and extra-system
volatility appear to be largely driven by different factors, or
in different ways by the same factors in Latin American
countries. For example, the concurrency of presidential and
legislative elections tends to depress within-system volatility
but raise extra-system volatility. Therefore, when one examines only total volatility, one is likely to miss important relationships. Extra-system volatility appears to be driven by the
institutional arrangements and social demography of a country. Electoral systems that encourage political leaders to
coordinate appear to have a mitigating effect on extra-system
volatility. Higher levels of extra-system volatility tend to
characterize countries with lower levels of democracy and
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larger, more ethnically diverse populations. Just as Powell
and Tucker (2014) find that identifying factors that influence
within-system volatility is the more difficult task in postCommunist Europe, we find that only a couple of variables
included in our models affect within-system volatility in
Latin America. Given the small number of factors that appear
to influence within-system volatility in Latin America, the
effect of structural adjustment on this type of volatility is all
the more striking.

The findings of this study are also limited in certain
respects. First, the time-series for the analysis covers the
period of 1982 to 2016. Although this time frame is appropriate to test the main covariates of interest, it is possible that a
longer time-series would yield different results. Second, as
noted, the underlying reasons for the contrasting effects of
adjustment on electoral volatility in Africa and Latin America
remain unclear. We remain hopeful that future researchers
will address these issues in their work.

Appendix
Table A1. Independent Variables, Measures, and Sources.
Variable
IMF Program(t−1)
Party fractionalization(t−1)
Plurality system
Concurrent elections
Democracy(t−1)
Ethnic diversity
Population, log
GDP per capita (log, t−1)
GDP growth(t−1)
Age of democracy

Measure

Source(s)

Coded “1” if a country received disbursement
from the IMF in the previous year, “0”
otherwise. Lagged by 1 year.
Calculated by squaring the share of the parties in
an election and adding all the squares together,
lagged by 1 year
Coded “1” if at least some of the legislators were
elected using plurality electoral rules in either
the upper house or lower house, “0” otherwise.
Coded “1” if legislative and presidential elections
were held concurrently, “0” otherwise.
Polity IV scores, lagged by 1 year
Level of ethnic diversity
Log of population
Log of GDP per capita in constant 2010 USD,
lagged by 1 year
GDP growth in constant 2010 USD, lagged by 1
year
Years since first election in data set

IMF website, https://www.imf.org/external/index.htm
LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)
World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions
(Keefer 2012), https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/
dataset/wps2283-database-political-institutions
LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)
Marshall et al. (2017)
Alesina et al. (2003)
World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
World Bank Development Indicators (n.d.)
LAPALE data set (Cohen et al., 2018)

Table A2. List of Countries in Study and the Number of
Observed Elections Per Country.

Table A3. Countries and Years Receiving IMF
Disbursement.

Country

Observed elections

Country

16
7
8
6
9
8
8
12
10
7
8
11
5
6
5
8
6
7

Argentina

Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela

Bolivia
Brazil
Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay

Year
1987
2001
1989
2002
1986
1986

1989
2005
1993

1991

1993

1995

1997

2002

2005

1994

2006

2010

1986
1993
1985
2001
1994
1985
1999

1988
2001
1988
2011
1999

1990
2005
1991

1992

2002

2000

2004

Note: No observations for Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Paraguay, and Venezuela.

1997

2017
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